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Psychology Old and New
Abstract
Psychology as the study of mind was an established subject matter throughout the nineteenth century in
Britain, Germany, France, and the United States, taught in colleges and universities and made the subject of
books and treatises. During the period 1870-1914 this existing discipline of psychology was being
transformed into a new, experimental science, especially in Germany and the United States. The increase in
experimentation changed the body of psychological writing, although there remained considerable continuity
in theoretical content and non-experimental methodology between the old and new psychologies. This paper
follows the emergence of the new psychology out of the old in the national traditions of Britain (primarily
England), Germany, and the United States, with some reference to French, Belgian, Austrian, and Italian
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                                          Gary Hatfield
                                    University of Pennsylvania
          Psychology as the study of mind was an established subject matter throughout
          the nineteenth century in Britain, Germany, France, and the United States.
          This established psychology was in part a school discipline, conveyed in
          textbooks and lectures surveying the theory of mind.  Standard topics included
          the senses, imagination, memory, intellect, emotions, will, bodily motion, the
          nature of mind, and the question of mind-body interaction.  During this time
          psychology was also an object of research and speculation by physicians and
          independent scholars.  James Mill, John Stuart Mill, George Henry Lewes,
          Francis Galton, and George Romanes, none of whom held university appointments,
          published general works or specialist treatises on psychological topics.  From
          early in the century physicians conducted empirical research on sensory
          perception, drawing on their own perceptual experience and clinical
          observation.  Textbooks in human and comparative physiology contained
          psychological chapters, and medical journals published psychological work
          (e.g., Carpenter 1837, Dunn 1858).  Early on J. F. Herbart (1816 [1891],
          1824-25) and F. E. Beneke (1833) in Germany, and later Alexander Bain (1855,
          p. v) and Lewes (1857, p. 621) in Britain, renewed the call for a genuinely
          scientific psychology or ’science of mind’ (a call issued earlier by Bonnet
          1755 and Kr"uger 1756, among others).  By mid-century quantitative studies,
          found sparsely but regularly in eighteenth-century works on vision, were
          becoming common in sensory physiology and psychology.
               At universities, the discipline of psychology was variously located
          _________________________
          *Forthcoming as Chapter 8 of Thomas Baldwin (ed.), _C_a_m_b_r_i_d_g_e _H_i_s_t_o_r_y _o_f
          _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y: _1_8_7_0-_1_9_4_5 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
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          within faculties or schools of philosophy.  ’Philosophy’ at this time had both
          broad and narrow senses.  Broadly, it was roughly equivalent to the ’arts and
          sciences’; narrowly, it might be restricted to logic, metaphysics, moral
          philosophy, and natural philosophy (though the latter was becoming separate as
          ’natural science’).  Psychology was variously positioned under these rubrics,
          sometimes in metaphysics (Lotze 1881 [1886]), sometimes as an autonomous
          division of philosophy (Mill 1846, p. 532), but most often as an empirical
          natural science (Beneke 1845, p. 5; Wundt 1863, 1:iv).  It was known under
          various titles, including ’moral science’, ’mental science’, ’theory of the
          mind’, ’physiology of the mind’, and _S_e_e_l_e_n_l_e_h_r_e or theory of the soul.
               During the period 1870-1914 the existing discipline of psychology was
          transformed.  British thinkers including Herbert Spencer, Lewes, and Romanes
          allied psychology with biology and viewed mind as a function of the organism
          for adapting to the environment.  British and German thinkers called attention
          to social and cultural factors in the development of individual human minds.
          In Germany and the United States a tradition of psychology as a laboratory
          science soon developed, which was called a ’new psychology’ by contrast with
          the old, metaphysical psychology (Ribot 1879 [1886, pp. 1-15]; Scripture
          1897).  Methodological discussion intensified.  New syntheses were framed.
          Chairs were established and Departments founded.  Although the trend toward
          institutional autonomy was less rapid in Britain and France, significant work
          was done by the likes of Galton and Alfred Binet.  Even in Germany and America
          the purposeful transformation of the old psychology into a new, experimental
          science was by no means complete in 1914.  And while the increase in
          experimentation changed the body of psychological writing, there was
          considerable continuity in theoretical content and non-experimental
          methodology between the old and new psychologies.
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               This chapter follows the emergence of the new psychology out of the old
          in the national traditions of Britain (primarily England), Germany, and the
          United States, with some reference to French, Belgian, Austrian, and Italian
          thinkers.  While the division into national traditions is useful, the
          psychological literature of the second half of the nineteenth century was
          generally a European literature, with numerous references across national and
          linguistic boundaries, and it became a North Atlantic literature as psychology
          developed in the United States and Canada.  The order of treatment, Britain,
          Germany, and the US, follows the center of gravity of psychological activity.
          The final section considers some methodological and philosophical issues from
          these literatures.
                                  British Psychology, 1870-1914
          In 1870 the French philosopher and psychologist Th’eodule Ribot surveyed
          British psychology, hoping to transplant a non-metaphysical empirical
          psychology to France to replace the dualistic ’science of the human soul’
          (1870 [1874, p. 17]).  He praised the British tradition stemming from Locke,
          Hartley, and Hume and now embodied in the empirical and non-metaphysical
          psychologies of Bain, Spencer, Lewes, and J. S. Mill (and soon represented in
          France by Taine 1870 [1871]).
               British psychology was indeed flourishing in 1870, as the ensuing quarter
          century reveals (see Hearnshaw 1964, chaps. 1-11).  In 1876 Bain founded the
          journal _M_i_n_d, subtitled _A _Q_u_a_r_t_e_r_l_y _R_e_v_i_e_w _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y _a_n_d _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_y (until
          1974, long after properly psychological work was excluded).  Roughly half its
          pages were devoted to psychology, including some experimental and statistical
          reports.  While the journal was international in coverage, it reflected the
          two major trends in English psychology, toward a biological psychology on the
          one hand, and toward phenomenological analysis of mental phenomena on the
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          other.
               The traditional associationist psychology was represented by Bain, by
          James Mill (annotated edition, 1869), and then by Sully (1884, 1892).  It
          treated psychology as a science of mental phenomena or of consciousness.
          Indeed, J. S. Mill contended that unconscious mental states (as postulated by
          Hamilton) are a contradiction in terms (Mill 1865, chap. 15).  Associationists
          adopted the usual classification of mental phenomena under intellect, feeling,
          and will, but denied that it revealed underlying discrete mental faculties.
          Their main explanatory strategy was to discern or posit elements of
          consciousness and then show how the laws of association, operating on such
          elements, can explain mental abilities and mental phenomena more generally.
          The associative laws usually included a law of spatial or temporal contiguity
          and a law of similarity.
               Biological psychology was developed in England by medical physiologists
          such as William Carpenter and Henry Maudsley, by biologically inspired
          intellectuals such as Spencer and Lewes, and by research naturalists including
          Charles Darwin, Romanes, and C. Lloyd Morgan.
               Carpenter’s _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_l_e_s _o_f _M_e_n_t_a_l _P_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_y (1874) emphasised the mutual
          interaction of mind and body.  Following a chapter on the nervous system it
          was organized into psychological topics, including the usual coverage of the
          senses, attention, higher cognition, and motor action, together with medical
          topics such as intoxication and delirium.  Carpenter, who adopted a
          comparative perspective, recognized psychologically relevant instincts in
          animals, but argued that in humans there are no instincts beyond those
          involved in basic maintenance, such as the beating of the heart.  He explained
          all other apparently instinctual behavior in humans associationistically, as
          ’automatic’ behavior acquired through experience (1881, jf191).  The book built
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          a strong case, using clinical evidence and ordinary observation, that much
          mental activity occurs automatically as ’unconscious cerebration’ (1881, chap.
          13).  Carpenter nonetheless maintained that a certain ’fact of Consciousness’
          available in immediate experience, namely, ’that we have within us a self-
          determining Power which we call will’, was sufficient to refute materialism
          and show that two sorts of forces (mental and material) operate, and interact,
          in organic life, (1881, jf28; see also jfjf4-5, 26-7).
               Maudsley published his _P_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_y _o_f _M_i_n_d in 1876 (separated from
          Maudsley 1867).  He held mental states to be identical with brain states.
          Mental phenomena are grouped together because they are (partly) accessed
          through ’inner sense’ as opposed to outer sense (1876, p. 39). He disparaged
          the reigning method of introspection in psychology, citing several grounds,
          including: lack of agreement among observers; the disturbing effect of the
          introspective act on the phenomena to be observed; restricted applicability to
          adult human minds, as opposed to the developing mind of the child, or mind in
          other species; and failure to reveal the basis for the laws of association,
          which must be physiological (1876, pp. 16-50).  He denounced introspection’s
          inability to reach the great majority of mental states and processes which, he
          contended, are unconscious (1876, pp. 24-40).  He recommended that
          introspection be replaced with ’objective’ methods, including physiological,
          comparative, and developmental observations, and the study of pathological
          cases, biography, and history--the latter because (with Comte) ’the individual
          is a social unit and cannot be comprehended independently of the social medium
          in which he lives’ (1876, p. 53).  After discussing the spinal cord and reflex
          action, he discussed the central nervous system according to the traditional
          psychological topics.  Maudsley was one of the few materialistic monists
          (1876, chap. 2) who contributed to the new psychology, most other monists
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          arguing for parallelism or dual-aspect theory.
               Spencer and Lewes promoted a biological psychology that regarded mind as
          a means of adjusting or adapting the organism to environmental circumstances.
          In 1855 Spencer defined life as ’the continuous adjustment of internal
          relations to outer relations’ and intelligence as ’the adjustment of inner to
          outer relations’ (1855, pp. 374, 486).  In the enlarged (and widely cited)
          second edition of 1870-72, he distinguished ’objective’ psychology, dealing
          with material organismic processes, from the study of ’subjective’ processes
          available to consciousness (pt. 1, chap. 7).  Objective psychology concerns
          the adaptive adjustment of the relations between states internal to the
          organism to relations of external states of affairs.  If its explanations are
          restricted to ’actions’ or ’conduct’, that is, to behavior, they need appeal
          only to ’objective’ factors (see also Mercier 1888).  Such explanations
          hypothesize that nervous states become adapted to external situations, as when
          the nervous action initiated by sight of an apple comes to trigger reaching
          for the apple (an internal relation that now ’corresponds to’ the _d_e _f_a_c_t_o
          external relation between the physical shape and color of the apple and its
          nutritional composition).  Subjective psychology describes consciously
          available mental states that correspond (by a parallelism between mental and
          physical, both expressing a single unknown reality) to some of the processes
          of objective psychology.  Lewes’ _P_r_o_b_l_e_m_s _o_f _L_i_f_e _a_n_d _M_i_n_d (1874, 1877, 1879,
          1880) similarly treated mind as a biological function of the organism, and
          recognized an essential social condition on mind in humans (which accounted
          for the observed differences between humans and their biologically similar
          primate relatives).  Spencer and Lewes both made association the engine of
          psychological development, but they also recognized a fixed organic component
          in psychological responses.  Typical associationists restricted innate factors
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          to sensations and associative laws, but Lewes saw that evolutionary theory
          supported attribution of a wider range of innate mental adaptations to
          organisms, including humans (1879, chaps. 1, 9), a point of view developed
          more extensively by Romanes (1883, 1888) and Morgan (1891, pp. 336-8).
               James Ward brought psychology back to phenomenology in his influential
          survey for the _B_r_i_t_a_n_n_i_c_a (1886).  He drew widely on the established
          literature, including Herbart, Lotze, Wundt, Hamilton, Mill, Bain, Spencer,
          and Lewes.  For Ward the standpoint of psychology is individual consciousness;
          scientific psychology is agnostic about the metaphysics of realism or
          idealism.  Ward contended that an active self or ego must be recognized in
          psychology, apart from representations or ’presentations’ to that self.  He
          endorsed attention as the fundamental psychological activity, more important
          in thinking than association, which he saw as having its primary effect in
          memory.  He adopted a developmental or ’genetic’ view, according to which
          instincts arise from psychological habits that become fixed through
          inheritance of acquired characteristics (a mechanism endorsed by Darwin [1859,
          p. 209; 1872, p. 29] and majorized by Spencer and Lewes).  Ward’s student, G.
          F. Stout, also criticized the atomizing tendency of associationism, stressing
          the phenomenal unity and directed activity of mental life (1896).  Stout drew
          from the early phenomenological tradition in psychology, including the work of
          Stumpf, Brentano, Ehrenfels, and Meinong.
               University laboratories arose late, founded in the mid 1890s at Cambridge
          and in 1897 at University College London.  But from the 1870s onward there was
          frequent discussion of the relations between ’subjective’ and ’objective’
          methods and subject matter in psychology.  The method of introspection,
          attacked by Maudsley (and earlier, Comte 1830-42 [1855, pp. 33, 383-4]), was
          widely defended as the only access to the ’subjective’ side of psychology’s
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          subject matter, the conscious states of the individual, and its scientific
          (hence, ’objective’ in the sense of true, or properly established) credentials
          were affirmed (Lewes 1879, chaps. 3, 5; Ward 1886, pp. 42-3).  Many objective
          factors were listed for inclusion in psychology’s methodology, including
          physiological observations, comparative psychology, the outward expression of
          emotions, the development of language, historical records of human actions,
          and ’natural experiments’ afforded by mental and neural pathology (Maudsley
          1876, chap. 1; Lewes 1879, chap. 8; Stout 1896, 1:9-16).  Among these the
          focus was on (largely speculative) physiological factors, such as postulated
          muscle feelings, evolutionary hypotheses, and comparative observations.
          Spencer (1870-72, pts. 3-5), and his follower the mental pathologist Charles
          Mercier (1888), appealed to such objective factors in elaborating explanations
          of behavior, their ’objective’ subject matter for psychology.  For this
          subject matter Mercier especially eschewed all reference to consciousness and
          appealed only to hypothesized internal physiological states adjusted and
          adapted to the environment.  By contrast Ward, who took consciousness to be
          the sole subject matter of psychology, questioned whether physiological
          knowledge was sufficiently advanced to be of any help (1886, p. 90).  On that
          score he was not in disagreement with Spencer (1870-72, 1:140-1), who presaged
          the later assertion by Stout that psychological results must guide any
          investigation of the physiological conditions of mental processes (1896,
          1:26-35).
                                   German Psychology, 1870-1914
          Whereas in 1870 Ribot credited British psychology with initiating a ’new
          epoch’ of scientific psychology, (1870 [1874, p. 44]), nine years later he
          said it was the Germans who created a ’new psychology’ (Ribot 1879 [1886, pp.
          9-15]).  He now characterized British psychology as ’descriptive’ next to the
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          physiological and experimental psychology of the Germans.  The crucial factor
          was the introduction of experimental techniques into psychology from sensory
          physiology, by figures including Johannes M"uller (founder of the experimental
          tradition according to Ribot 1879 [1886, p. 21]), as well as E. H. Weber,
          Rudolph Hermann Lotze, G. W. Fechner, Wilhelm Wundt, Hermann Helmholtz, and
          Ewald Hering (see Hatfield 1990, chaps. 4-5).
               In the period 1850-75 Lotze was the foremost German academic philosopher
          and psychologist (Brentano, Stumpf, and G. E. M"uller were among his students).
          He analyzed spatial perception in his _M_e_d_i_c_i_n_i_s_c_h_e _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, _o_d_e_r,
          _P_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_i_e _d_e_r _S_e_e_l_e (1852), where he introduced the doctrine of ’local
          signs’.  He contended that the merely physical spatial order of the retinal
          receptors and optic nerve could not itself explain the spatial order of
          perception.  Rather, the sensation from each nerve fiber must receive a
          qualitative marker peculiar to that fiber, from which the spatial order of
          retinal stimulation might be reconstructed through a psychological process,
          whether innate (Lotze’s early view, 1852, pp. 330-7, 354-60) or learned
          (Helmholtz’s view, 1867 [1924-25, pp. 185-6], and later Lotze’s, 1881 [1886,
          p. 56]).  The problem of deriving spatially-ordered perceptions from discrete
          nerve fibers was long discussed (James 1890, 2:157).
               In 1834 the physiologist Weber published what became known as Weber’s
          Law.  This law concerned the _j_u_s_t _n_o_t_i_c_e_a_b_l_e _d_i_f_f_e_r_e_n_c_e_s between intensities
          of a stimulus, that is, the amount by which a stimulus dimension, such as
          weight, had to be increased in order to produce a noticeable difference.
          Weber found that within limits this amount varies as a constant fraction of
          the stimulus value, at least for pressure on the skin, weights lifted by hand,
          line lengths perceived by sight, and the pitches of tones.  The physicist
          Gustav Fechner developed Weber’s result into a fundamental law of
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          psychophysics (1860 [1966]).  Fechner argued that the relation between
          physical stimuli needed to produce a noticeably different sensation yields an
          indirect measurement of the sensation itself.  His argument explicitly assumed
          that the just noticeable difference is a constant unit of sensation, that is,
          that the differences between each pair of just noticeably different sensations
          are equal; and it treated the threshold of sensation--that is, the smallest
          perceivable value, e.g., the smallest pressure that can be felt on the skin--
          as defining the zero point for the scale of sensations, and the unit value for
          the physical stimulus.  Using these assumptions he produced his famous
          psychophysical law, according to which sensation varies as the log of the
          stimulus value times a constant (which means that felt intensity goes up
          arithmetically while the stimulus intensity increases geometrically).  (For
          discussion, see Delboeuf 1883a&b, Fechner 1882, G. E. M"uller 1878.)
          Psychophysical measurements became the pride of the new psychology; Weber and
          Fechner were widely cited in the German, British, French, and American
          literatures.
               The empirical investigation of mental phenomena blossomed.  Wundt (1862),
          Hering (1861-64, 1868), and Helmholtz (1867) investigated spatial perception,
          including binocular stereopsis.  Careful quantitative observations were made
          to determine the _e_m_p_i_r_i_c_a_l _h_o_r_o_p_t_e_r, that is, the imaginary line along which a
          point, when viewed with two eyes, appears single, and off of which (by some
          distance) it appears doubled.  Helmholtz, Hering, and their students also
          investigated color perception, carrying out precise quantitative
          investigations of color matches for stimuli of known wavelength, color
          contrast phenomena, and color deficient or ’color blind’ individuals (see
          Turner 1994).  In 1879 Wundt established the first regular psychological
          laboratory.  Many students and visitors worked there, on visual, auditory, and
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          tactile psychophysics, and on reaction time, attention, and feeling.  In 1883
          he began a journal, _P_h_i_l_o_s_o_p_h_i_s_c_h_e _S_t_u_d_i_e_n, which, despite its title, largely
          served as the house organ of the Leipzig laboratory.  In the meantime Georg
          Elias M"uller (1878, 1904) took Lotze’s place at G"ottingen in 1881,
          establishing an important and productive laboratory.  In 1885 Hermann
          Ebbinghaus published his epoch-making experimental work on memory (1885
          [1913]), gaining him a professorship in Berlin the following year.
               Wundt gave new voice to the call for a scientific psychology.  In 1863 he
          published his lectures on human and comparative psychology, and in 1874 his
          _G_r_u_n_d_z"_u_g_e _d_e_r _p_h_y_s_i_o_l_o_g_i_s_c_h_e_n _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e.  The latter became the herald of
          the new experimental psychology (French translation, 1886; open emulation by
          Ladd 1887).  Wundt’s conception of psychology as a science changed over time
          (see Hatfield 1997).  In 1862-63 he treated psychology as a natural science
          that would be supplemented by other methods, including historical study of the
          cultural development of human mentality.  He saw human cognition as unified by
          logical acts of synthesis, exemplified in unconscious inferences that
          synthesize perceptions out of sensations (1862, pp. 422-45).  In 1874 Wundt
          regarded psychology as intermediate between natural science and the mental or
          human sciences (_G_e_i_s_t_e_s_w_i_s_s_e_n_s_c_h_a_f_t_e_n).  He rejected unconscious mental
          processes, saying that any such processes must be conceived physiologically
          and nonmentally.  And while he retained the basic view that the elements of
          experience are sensations varying only in quality and intensity, he abandoned
          logical form as the unifying element of cognition, arguing that psychological
          processes are prior to any mental appreciation of logical structure (1874,
          chap. 18).  These processes of psychical synthesis combine elements to create
          ’ideas’ (_V_o_r_s_t_e_l_l_u_n_g_e_n) having new attributes, not found in any element, as
          when nonspatial sensations are synthesized to create spatial perceptions
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          (chaps. 11-12).  Wundt distinguished passive association from ’apperception’,
          an active mental process, allied to attention, which forms new mental
          connections.  The enlarged second edition (1880, chaps. 15-17) expanded the
          role of apperception as the central cognitive act.
               Wundt increasingly emphasised the variety of influences on apperception.
          To understand the apperceptive process in an adult human in the nineteenth
          century, Wundt believed, one would have to consider her cultural context,
          which would have to be approached through the historical development of the
          belief system of the culture in question, together with the personal
          development of the individual.  He thus came to think that the processes of
          higher cognition could best be approached through _V"_o_l_k_e_r_p_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_e, or
          ethnographic psychology, which he regarded on par with the physiological or
          experimental branch (1887, 1:5-6), or as likely to replace it (1908, p. viii).
          In one of the few attempts actually to distill ’objective’ materials for
          psychology from history and culture, Wundt (1900-20) sought to reveal the
          developmental laws of human thought through the history of language, myth, and
          morals.  Many German experimental psychologists rejected Wundt’s claim that
          higher mental processes could not be subjected to experiment, and many
          regarded psychology as properly a natural science (see Kusch 1999, chap. 1-2).
               Wundt (1894) held that his (ontologically agnostic) psychophysical
          parallelism entailed that mental and physical phenomena form two distinct but
          parallel causal realms.  He advocated a ’pure’ psychology according to which
          psychological states can be caused only by other psychological states.  His
          students Oswald K"ulpe (1893 [1895, pp. 4-6]) and the British-American
          Titchener (1909b, pp. 13-15) also endorsed parallelism and avoided positing
          direct causal relations between mental and physical.  But their parallelism
          did not preclude physiological processes from playing an explanatory role in
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          psychology (see Danziger 1979).  They found it obvious that psychological
          phenomena are ’dependent on’ or ’correlated with’ nervous states which have
          resulted from processes that are unavailable to consciousness.  K"ulpe
          postulated ’unconscious’ purely physiological states (1893 [1895, pp. 291,
          450]), while Titchener described his nonconscious physiological states
          psychologically, as carriers of ’meaning’ over time (1909b, p. 369).
               The early experimental psychologists knew and discussed Franz Brentano’s
          (1874) descriptive psychology of consciousness.  Ribot (1979 [1886, p. 295])
          classed it with the ’new psychology’ because it was empirically based and left
          aside metaphysics.  Brentano argued that psychological states are
          characterized by their directedness toward a phenomenally available object.
          His book did not fulfill the aim of establishing a common theoretical
          framework for scientific psychology, but it did influence discussions of
          mental content and judgment in Germany and Austria (see Chapter 12), and it
          found appreciation in England (Stout 1896, 1:40-2) and America (Titchener
          1909a, lec. 2).  Brentano’s students, including Carl Stumpf and Christian von
          Ehrenfels, provided fodder for Gestalt psychology.
                                  American Psychology, 1870-1914
          In 1870 psychology in America was a school discipline largely under Scottish
          influence (Upham 1841; McCosh 1886).  This ’old psychology’ was usually allied
          with religion and generally taught by the Provost, who also taught moral
          philosophy (see Evans 1984).  The United States was late to develop a ’new
          psychology’, perhaps because it had neither Britain’s thriving gentlemen
          scholars nor Germany’s research universities.  But once it took hold, the new
          psychology developed more rapidly in the US than elsewhere, benefiting from
          late-century foundings of new research universities and graduate schools.  By
          1900, laboratories had been established at forty-two North American colleges
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          and universities.  Many American psychologists passed through Wundt’s
          laboratory as visitors or students (Hilgard 1987, pp. 31-4, 79).  Some took
          PhDs in the US, including George T. Ladd and James M. Baldwin under James
          McCosh at Princeton, and G. Stanley Hall under William James at Harvard.
          During the 1880s Hall founded laboratories at Johns Hopkins and Clark, and
          started the _A_m_e_r_i_c_a_n _J_o_u_r_n_a_l _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y.  Baldwin was a major force in the
          1890s, publishing an important handbook (1889, 1891), establishing
          laboratories, and co-founding the _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_i_c_a_l _R_e_v_i_e_w in 1894 (with J. M.
          Cattell).
               The new American psychology gained textual presence through books by Ladd
          and James.  Both authors were advocates of a new psychology, but neither was
          convinced that experiment would be its defining feature.  Ladd 1887 was the
          first systematic textbook of the new physiological psychology in English.  It
          defended the importance of the physiological and experimental approach,
          provided considerable coverage of the nervous system, summarized primary
          results in psychophysics, and devoted a chapter to chronometric studies.  It
          also contained an argument for the reality of the mind as a spiritual being,
          presented as a scientific hypothesis to explain the unity of consciousness
          (1887, pp. 668-88).  Ladd later elaborated a distinction between a
          descriptive, explanatory, empirical psychology of consciousness (1894), and a
          rational or metaphysical psychology (1895).  As a framework for psychology he
          defended a provisional dualism, leaving it to philosophy to establish his
          preferred Lotzean monism, with Absolute Being underlying both body and mind
          (Ladd 1895, pp. 409-12).
               James’ two-volume _P_r_i_n_c_i_p_l_e_s _o_f _P_s_y_c_h_o_l_o_g_y put a phenomenalist and
          functionalist stamp on theoretical psychology in America.  It synthesized and
          appraised the main theory and findings concerning sensation and perception,
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          cognition, and will.  James defined psychology as ’the Science of Mental Life,
          both of its phenomena and of their conditions’ (1890, 1:1), the latter
          including nervous processes, behavioral consequences, and environmental
          conditions.  With a hint of irony, he labeled both ’spiritualist’ and
          ’associationist’ theories as metaphysical, because each attempts ’to _e_x_p_l_a_i_n
          our phenomenally given thoughts as products of deeper-lying entities’, among
          which he included not only ’Soul’, but also ’Ideas’ or ’Elementary Units of
          Consciousness’ (James 1890 1:vi).  He was not opposed to explanation in
          general, but he rejected appeals to mind-stuff or to atomistic sensations (as
          posited by Hume, Mill, Helmholtz, and Wundt) to explain conscious experience.
          James’ own explanations appealed to physiology, acquired habit, and the
          function of mind in adjusting the organism to its environment.  He considered
          the main methods of psychology to be introspection, experiment, and the
          ’comparative method’ applied to children and across cultures, to ’madmen,
          idiots, the deaf and blind, criminals, and eccentrics’, and to the history of
          science, politics, and culture (1:194).  James reported the new experimental
          findings from Germany but was not much impressed by them, proclaiming that in
          many cases great effort had ’as yet borne little theoretic fruit’, while
          admitting that more work would be done and allowing that it might well yield
          theory (1:193).
               The Englishman Edward Bradford Titchener, who studied philosophy at
          Oxford, psychology at Leipzig, and then went to Cornell University in 1892,
          was a leading presence in American experimental psychology.  Titchener (1908,
          1909a&b) adopted Wundt’s elementalism and the Leipzig laboratory’s interest in
          chronometry.  But he deviated from Wundt in treating attention not as an
          independent mental activity but as a property of sensation (1908, lec. 6), and
          in accepting physiological processes as explanatory in psychology (1909b, pp.
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          38-41).  In pursuing the Wundtian project of resolving mental life into into
          its elements, he adopted the method of analytic introspection.  Other American
          psychologists, including John Dewey (1896) and James Rowland Angell (1907),
          focused on the function of mental processes, over the search for elements.
          Titchener (1898) himself divided psychology into ’structuralist’ and
          ’functionalist’ camps, initiating the American practice of classifying
          psychologies into various ’schools’ or ’systems’ (see Heidbredder 1933).
               The experimental tradition grew rapidly in America, soon supplemented by
          other empirical techniques, including questionnaires and mental testing.
          Nonetheless, the theoretical and philosophical bent in Ladd, Baldwin, and
          James continued into the new century (see Murchison 1926, 1930).  When Boring
          wrote his history of experimental psychology in 1929, he wanted to consolidate
          the identity of American psychology as an emphatically experimental science,
          divorced from philosophy and speculation (see O’Donnell 1979).  Through the
          efforts of Boring and others this conception held sway through much of the
          twentieth century.
                         Psychological Method, Subject Matter, and Theory
          Psychological works contained discussions of psychology’s subject matter, its
          methods, its relation to philosophy and metaphysics, the existence of
          unconscious mental states, and the plausibility of attributing innate
          faculties or representational capacities to the mind.  These philosophical
          topics were addressed sometimes out of necessity, as in the debates on method
          or subject matter, sometimes because philosophy and psychology had a shared
          interest, as in the question of mental faculties, and sometimes to assure that
          a clear boundary was maintained between fields.  Those like Wundt, James, or
          Ladd, who were both philosophers and psychologists, nonetheless recognized
          psychology as an independent subject matter or discipline.
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               Conceptions of psychology’s subject matter developed and changed.  Early
          on, some authors held that psychology could settle the metaphysical question
          of the substantiality of the soul.  Although McCosh (1886, p. 7) tried to
          establish the soul’s existence through direct introspection, the most common
          argument posited an immaterial soul as a scientific hypothesis needed to
          explain the unity of consciousness (Waitz 1878, pp. 24-36, 119-20).  Others
          used similar arguments to support a monism of causally interacting simple
          beings, including some dubbed as ’souls’ (Lotze 1881 [1886, pp. 91-104]).
          Increasingly, metaphysical questions about mind-body interaction and
          substantiality were bracketed.  The motivation varied, from positivism and
          critical idealism to a plain attitude that the sciences cannot answer
          metaphysical questions, which are left to philosophy.  Most authors considered
          psychology to be a natural science, which meant ceasing to talk of ’the mind’
          as its subject matter, or perhaps regarding ’mind’ as a natural activity of
          the organism (without necessarily endorsing materialism).  The new psychology
          was, in Lange’s oft-repeated phrase, a ’psychology without a soul’ (1866
          [1925, 3:168]).
               With talk of a unitary mental substance banned, new formulations of
          psychology’s subject matter had to be developed.  We have seen that Spencer
          and Mercier took one branch of psychology to focus on explaining behavior.
          But most authors made mental phenomena the sole subject matter of psychology,
          and saw behavior merely as an expression of mind.  These authors variously
          described psychology’s subject matter as ’phenomena of mind’ (Sully 1884, pp.
          1-2), ’phenomena of consciousness’ (Baldwin 1889, p. 8), or ’immediate
          experience’ (Wundt 1901 [1902, p. 3].  This subject matter was to be studied
          with both ’subjective’ and ’objective’ methods, including direct reports of
          experience, behavioral manifestations, and physiological conditions.
                                              - 18 -
               Supposing that the object of description and explanation in psychology is
          conscious experience, there was further division over the type of entities or
          states to be admitted into psychological explanations.  Some insisted that
          only conscious mental states be admitted.  Others posited unconscious mental
          states that produce conscious mental states, while still others posited
          physiological states (not directly correlated with consciousness) as causes or
          explanatory conditions.  Some considered such physiological states to be
          psychological, others not.
               In the days of realism about immaterial mind, theorists readily posited
          unconscious ideas or representations that were ’below threshold’ (in
          Herbartian terms)--though Ladd, an immaterialist of sorts, later protested on
          behalf of ’psychological science’ (1894, pp. 30, 258).  Some anti-metaphysical
          empiricists viewed such posits as tantamount to the self-contradiction of
          unconscious conscious states (Mill 1865, chap. 15), though others happily
          referred to unconscious sensations and mental processes (Helmholtz 1867
          [1924-25, 3:4]).  By century’s end the chief defender of the latter position
          among German academic psychologists was the panpsychist Theodor Lipps (1903).
               In the 1880s and 90s, a majority understood ’subconscious’ and
          ’unconscious’ states in relation to attention (see Cesca 1885).  On this view,
          all mental states have some degree of consciousness, but some are least
          attended and so least salient, and these may be called subconscious or
          unconscious (Ward 1886, pp. 52-4).  A sensory state could be mental only if it
          had the qualitative character of experienced sensations (Wundt 1880, 2:195).
          Truly unconscious (as opposed to unnoticed or forgotten) sensations or mental
          operation were rejected; any mentally-relevant processes and states that fall
          outside consciousness were assigned to pure physiology and considered
          nonmental (Brentano 1874 [1973], bk. 2, chap. 2; Stout 1899, pp. 8-9; Wundt
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          1901 [1902, pp. 227-8]; Ziehen 1891 [1892, pp. 20-36]).  From this
          perspective, some physiological states have psychological concomitants; some
          physiological states without such concomitants are explanatorily relevant for
          psychology; but there are no purely physiological, nonconscious mental or
          psychological processes.
               The English mental physiologists and biological psychologists,
          materialist and anti-materialist, took the opposite stand.  Maudsley proposed
          ’that all the operations which are considered mental and to belong to
          psychology may be performed as pure functions of the nervous system, without
          consciousness giving evidence of them’ (1876, p. 245).  Carpenter offered as
          examples of possibly unconscious mental activity playing music, reading aloud
          while thinking about something else, and thinking about writing while also
          dipping the pen and spelling the words right (1881, p. 526).  Lewes wrote
          extensively on the relations among conscious, subconscious, and unconscious
          mental states (1877, prob. III, chap. 4; 1879, pp. 19-25, 91-9; 1880, prob.
          II, chap. 10).  Subconscious states are merely conscious states not under
          attention, whose existence he took for granted.  He was keen to gain
          recognition for genuinely unconscious states and operations, including the
          process of assimilating present experience to the ’residua’ or ’traces’ of
          previous experience (1880, p. 54).  Lewes posited a great number of
          unconscious factors, some cognitive, such as habits arising from repeated
          excitation, and some visceral, such as emotional episodes:
               Besides the residual effect of multiple excitations through the
               senses, there is the influence of some recurrent stimulation from
               the viscera, or from some emotional shock which has left behind its
               persistent tremors.  Deep down in the recesses of the organism there
               are thus influences at work, which only emerge into consciousness at
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               intervals, but which are always modulating the mental state. (1880,
               p. 112)
          Lewes was a dual-aspect monist (1877, prob. III, chap. 3) who held that
          organic processes can be at once physiological and psychological (1880, p.
          149).  Those organismic states having a mental aspect need not be conscious.
          A state is mental because it enters into the organism’s overall mental
          functioning, not because it is accessible to consciousness.  Around the turn
          of the century many psychologists endorsed the notion that physiological
          states could be psychological without being accompanied by consciousness
          (M"uller and Pilzecker 1900, pp. 78-82, 271; Titchener 1909b, pp. 38-41, 369).
          The functionalist Angell defended regular appeal to physiological processes in
          psychology on the grounds that psychological activity is a form of biological
          adjustment; he decried the usual parallelism as ’insipid, pale, and
          passionless’ (1907, p. 81) and invoked an instrumentalist attitude toward the
          mind-body distinction itself, suggesting that mind be seen as an activity of
          organisms.
               Of all the theoretical and methodological issues attending the new
          psychology, the place of introspection is most notorious.  Despite widespread
          acknowledgment of ’objective’ methods, the main experimental and observational
          methods of the new psychology relied on introspection, loosely defined.
          Introspection as defended by Brentano (1874 [1973, pp. 29-30]) involved
          retrospective verbal reports of one’s recent mental phenomena.  Introspective
          analysis might include attempts by trained observers to discern the elements
          of mental life, such as the dimensions of feeling or emotion.  In
          psychophysical experiments subjects reported their phenomenal responses to
          physical stimuli.  Stout, describing successful cases of introspection,
          observed that in such experiments subjects are not asked ’What process do you,
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          by introspection, find to be going on in your mind?’ but rather ’What do you
          see?’ (1896, 1:12).  But even as Stout wrote, psychologists interested in
          mental functions or acts (as opposed to static contents) were using
          retrospective reports in an attempt to discern process, instigating the
          controversy between Wundt and the W"urzburg school over proper experimental
          method (Kusch 1999, chaps. 1-2).  Introspection got a bad name, since even
          trained observers as preferred by Wundt disagreed among themselves, a result
          Titchener (1909a, pp. 6-7) suggested might partly reflect individual
          differences.  Leaving aside behaviorism (see Chapter 53), when after 1914
          ’introspective methods’ were rejected in psychological research into mental
          phenomena, as in Gestalt work on perception and cognition (see  Chapter 54),
          reports of experience were not abandoned, but rather the analytic
          introspective search for psychological elements.
               By 1900 psychology as an experimental natural science had been born,
          though scientific psychology was not as yet equated with experimental
          psychology.  At this time Freud was developing his own theory of the
          unconscious (see Chapter 9), which influenced personality theory but was never
          strongly integrated into academic psychology.  Already in 1900 advocates of a
          comparative approach were questioning the scientific acceptability of
          mentalistic theory in general (Loeb 1900, pp. 10-14), foreshadowing the
          behavioristic revolution that soon swept over psychology and achieved
          dominance at mid century.
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